

HUGO GROTIUS

OF THE

Government and Rites of the Antient
Church.

Conciliation of Grace and Free-
will.

Certainty and Assurance of Salvati-
on.

Government of the Highest Powers
in Church-affairs.

In a LETTER

To the States Embassador.

LONDON,

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Gerardus Vossius. de Idol. 1. 36.

The most illustrious *Hugo Grotius*
greater then all praise.

Dr. Casaubon.

I have always admired the wit and
judgment of *Grotius*, and have had a
peculiar veneration for his writings.

Lege ult. expired.

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To the Right Honourable Sir R o-
BERT VINER Lord
Maior of London.

My Lord,

IN remembrance of your worthy Brother,
our late Dean of Gloucester, I offer your
Lordship these brief Discourses. In his Study,
I first met with that useful Collection of Ec-
clesiastical Epistles, where this is exstant. At
his House, under his favour, first came I into
your knowledge. Now, after his decease, his
Name, dear still to us who once enjoyed his learn-
ed, generous, and obliging Converse, will add some
Grace unto these Papers in your Eye: and
your Name, my Lord, worthily advanced to
your high Office, will make them acceptable to
some of this great people under your Government.
I heartily wish, we may all Translate into our
minds the sedate and pacific temper of this
Author. A man above my Praise. Whose
Writings (as it was said, in the last Age, of
his Country-man the great Erasmus) are the
delight of our learned World. If any Reader
please to dissent from the Opinion of the excel-
lent Grotius, he may: but then he ought not
to be displeased, if another dissent from him.

A

A difference in some Questions may well consist with Christian Charity. The encrease of this rare virtue is the Design both of the Author and the Translator.

God Almighty, grant your Lordship a year of peace: that you may see the State and Church-affairs to flourish; and Pious men who now go under several new, to close in one and that the old and best Denomination.

Your Lordships

faithful Servant

Cl. Barksdale.

(1)



A Letter of

HUGO GROTIUS

To the

States Embassador

IN

FRANCE

*Touching the Government and Rites of the
Ancient Church, the Conciliation of Grace
and Free-will, the Government of the High-
est Powers in Church-affairs.*

S I R,

Consulting with my self about an An-
swer to the Writing of the famous
Molinaus, I return unto this Epistolar office
for some time intermitted. If I should say
nothing, I should injure the truer opinions

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concerning the rites and government of the antient Church, the Conciliation of Grace and Free-will, the government of the highest Powers in affairs Ecclesiastical. All which, either by reason of his haste into England, or because his exact care of other controversies gave him no leisure to consider of these, were not handled by *Molinaus* according to his usual learning. Truly, I am not glad he read that part of my letter, wherein I did with some freedom touch the maladies of the *Gallican* Churches: for there are few, that can patiently endure the handling of their Ulcers. Being offended herewith, he does me great injury in answering so, as if I dissuaded the nearer union of the Protestant Churches, when as I have many years had the same wishes with him, and cease not to do all the service I can to that end.

But, from your Epistle. most Noble Sir, what I writ had its rise, wherein you signified, the English Ambassador gave small hope of promoting that business. Hence I took occasion to search after the causes, which might hinder so good a design. God grant my Conjectures be not true.

Whether the reformed French have so much reverence for the highest Powers as the English,

English, these very times, I fear, will give too great an evidence. The King of Great Britain long since hath declared his judgment, that the too near equality of Churchmen will not consist with due obedience, and he hath been often heard to say: *No Bishop, No King*. That in England, there is more respect given to the antient Church then in France, I wonder any man will deny. In the *Canons* of the *Anglican church* written in the year 1571 I find this: *The preachers* shall have a special care that they deliver nothing in their Sermons, but what is agreeable to the old and new Testament, and which the Catholick Fathers and old Bishops have collected thence, I much doubt whether the French ministers will receive this law.

Touching *Rites*, I am sure, the English Liturgy, the imposition of hands at Confirmation of baptized children, the authority of Bishops, Convocation of Priests alone, and many like things agree well with the institutes of the more antient Church, from which things we must needs confess in *France* and *Belgium* they have receded. That *He* hath a better esteem of Bishops and Confirmation, I rejoyce but he is not ignorant, that some of his acquaintance call the one a device of *Satan*, the other a note of *Antichrist*: a sort

of men, great enemies to the Churches peace True it is which *Molinæus* affirms, peace may consist with different rites and discipline: but then, great care must be had, that they prefer not their own too much above others, especially things lately invented above those which are received from antiquity.

Molinæus imagines I meant cunningly to engage him in the *Belgic* controversies: but I can religiously protest, I had no other purpose, but by your mediation to get the assistance of his Council for my self and others toward the making of peace. For, having formerly seen another writing of his, concerning concord to be made between protestants, the *Lutherans* also included; in which he clearly professeth, that many questions, not necessary to salvation, are to be laid aside: and namely, those moved by *Arminius*, of predestination, of freewill, and of perseverance: I verily thought, he would propose such a form of doctrine therein as not to condemn the opinion, which I will not say *Arminius*, but *Melanchthon* liked best. He does indeed propose some *Theses*, which he saith agree with the doctrine of *Austin*, *Prosper*, *Fulgentius*, and the *Arausican* Council. But, they that differ from *Molinæus* will ask, why the
authority

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Authority of *Austin* must be greater then of all the Fathers, who lived in the elder and the purer times, i. e. within 400 years after the birth of Christ. From whom, what we have received, the King of *Great Britain* doth profess he will never condemn, and very many of us are of the same mind.

Now, all they nearest to the Apostles Age and their successors, many of them, both Bishops and Martyrs, held Gods purpose, and predestination according to prescience: that he made some vessels of honor, some of dishonor, because he fore-saw the end of every one, and fore-knew their will and deed under the aid of Grace: as their Books do testify, and *Prosper* doth in plain words confess: *This is the constant judgment of those Fathers that the will is free in believing, yet not without the aid of divine Grace.*

As to the *Arausican* Council, there is not any thing at all touching the question of predestination, whether it be with prescience, or by a decree without prescience: but *Anathema* is pronounced against them, that say any men are by the divine law predestinate to evil. In the same it is said: *Grace to believe is conferred upon all that desire to be baptized, And, All the baptized are able to fulfil all things pertaining to salvation, by the help of Christ.*

The most clear doctriens of *Prosper* are these

No:

No man is predestinate to sin: From the unpredestinate also, original sin is taken away by baptismal grace, and he that denies it is no catholick: Such as are not predestinate are therefore not predestinate, because they were foreknown what they would be. i. revolters without correction of penitence. All are rightly said to be redeemed, but not all delivered out of captivity: God would have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth but they that come, are directed by Gods help; they that come not, resist by their own perzinacy: and the word All is to be understood universally. There is given always to all men a certain measure of doctrin, though of more sparing and more secret grace, yet sufficient to some for remedy, to all for testimony; or (as it is else where explained,) The Grace of God is present to all men, by a various work and in a divers measure: Help is given to all by innumerable ways, To all is afforded a measure of general aid; it is their own wickedness whereby it is refused by many; that it is by many received, is the work of divine Grace and of humane will.

This is the definition of Fulgentius: God, to shew what he foreknew to be rendred, and what to be given, predestinated them to punishment, whom he foreknew to depart from him
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by the pravity of their evil will; and predestinated them to a Kingdom, whom he foreknew to believe in him by the aid of preventing Mercy, and to abide in him by the aid of subsequent Mercy.

Out of *Austin* many places might be alleged, even from his latter Writings, wherein he declareth, *That Free-will is helped and amended by Grace, not taken away.* Certainly, no diligent Reader of the Ancients will deny this; That *Austin* himself, *Prosper*, *Fulgentius*, and as many Catholick Writers as were either before or after them, held and taught this Doctrine: *Many justified and regenerated Persons do not persevere in Faith which worketh by Love, and some fall irrecoverably.* Whether the things written by *Molineus* do agree with these, let such as are skilful in them judge.

This is manifest to me; in the ancient Church it was the custom, to place in their *Creeds* only those things, wherein Catholick Writers always had agreed, omitting such as approved Authors had in doubt. And this way (as to me it seemeth) the *Arausican* Fathers took, and *Cælestinus*, Bishop of *Rome*, with assent doubtless of the most learned Priests then at *Rome*; and before these, the Bishops who met at *Diospolis*, at *Carthage*, at *Milevis*; *Innocentius* also, and *Zosimus* Roman Bishops

Bishops all, consulted about these very Controversies. Whose modesty (to speak with *Molinaus*) it is far better to imitate, than to adhere stiffly to preconceived Opinions, or to pluck away from the Unity of the Church those who have probable Reasons of a divers judgment in subtile Controversies.

But to believe that *Ignatius*, *Irenaus*, *Iustin*, *Cyprian*, *Martyrs*; and then *Athanasius*, *Basil*, *Gregory Nyssen*, *Nazianzen*, *Chrysostom*, *Ambrose*, *Ierom*, are to be condemned by us, as injurious to Gods grace, and as overthrowers of the Saints Confidence and Consolation, that cannot I as yet induce into my mind.

In the Writing of *Molinaus*, I find many things right and sober; nor doubt I, but if our Ministers would imitate his prudence, we should have the Church much more at Peace than now it is. But the things which in reading, and reading again, came into my consideration, are as followeth.

He sets down this as a most certain Truth, *Many things are done necessarily which are done freely*. I think not so. God, saith he, is necessarily good. This is true; yet freely. This I cannot acknowledge: For, *that is free which is undetermined to either side*. But God is determined by his Nature, i. by the Deity it self

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to good. So that it involves a contradiction to say; *He is God, and He can be not good. God cannot lye.* saith the Apostle: Therefore he is not free in not lying. True, God is (*sponste*) spontaneously veracious: But not all things that are done spontaneously, are done (*libere*) freely, as Philosophers well note. Many are deceived, by not discerning twixt the quality or general nature of Action, and the single kinds thereof. God created Man freely, redeemed him freely; and freely, in this or that manner, declar'd his Goodness. But this is not to be freely good, but to demonstrate his goodness freely so or so. And the Devil does evil necessarily, since by a free act he cast himself into this necessity: nevertheless in vexing *Job*, in tempting *Christ*, he acteth freely: for he might be evil, and not do evil in that kind. Likewise, a man sold under sin, sins necessarily, not freely: he cannot but sin: but he is an Adulterer freely, a Murderer freely, a Thief freely. Nor can I grant, to the settling of liberty 'tis sufficient to take away Coaction: for *Nature* is not less contrary to *liberty* than *Coaction* is. This does outwardly determine, that inwardly, and therefore causes the thing done to be done *not freely*. Neither is it free for a man, not to see, having his eyes
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open: because the nature of the eye and things visible is such, that he cannot chuse but see. But methinks they labour in vain, who study to reconcile things essentiall differing, such as are *necessary* and *free* (for liberty is the Mother of contingency) by respects. That indeed seemeth to me most true, especially if we speak of the ordinary way of Divine providence: *In whatsoever manner God moveth our wills, yet bath the will its liberty, and things have their contingency, as Molinaus excellently saith.* But he that saith so, must withall say; *The will is not moved by God in the way of predetermination.* For, that cannot be free, which to one side is predetermined and limited by any of the causes, and chiefly by the first cause, upon whose efficacy depend all inferior causes in their working: nor can any thing be contingent of which it may be said; *'Tis impossible for it not to be:* But 'tis impossible for the effect predetermined not to be, predetermination being granted.

I do also approve that which *Molinaus* affirms; *He is deservedly condemn'd, who abuseth the Seeds naturally sown in him, and does not use them in what manner and how far he might have done.* But what if he doth use the seeds in what manner and how far he is able,

ble, having the Divine aid of that measure which unto none is denied? Shall he be condemned nevertheless? He cannot then be said to be condemned for abusing, if having rightly used them he be nevertheless condemned,

Molinaus enquires, if any one, living in the most remote parts of the World, do make good use of the *first Grace*, whether God will send a Preacher to him, or an Angel. Suppose the Answer be affirmative, I know not how it can be refuted. For the hand of the Lord is not shortned. But he saith, it never comes to pass. How knows he that? Because we read it not. As if we had the Histories of those Nations; or, if we had, the things befalling every particular person, as the sending of an Angel, were wont to be related in Histories; when they use not often to come to the knowledge, no not of the next neighbours. And I see not how this can be deny'd to happen. Did not God appear to *Abraham*, living amongst the *Chaldeans*? Did he not appear to *Abimelech*? If you say, these did not make a right use of common gifts: I ask a reason, why we should believe God would shew his power less to such as do make that use, than to such as do not. Have not the Pro-

phets, have not the Apostles preached the Word to many Nations, wherein were some persons, if not well using, certainly less contumaciously abusing common gifts. To *Cornelius* the Centurion, praying and giving Alms (which by Grace one may do, who does not yet believe in Christ, as *Austin* expressly saith of *Cornelius*) there is sent both an Angel and an apostle. Who can assure us, God is less willing now to do so, or less able? Indeed, *Cornelius* was already endued with the spirit of the Law delivered by *Moses*: But 'tis confest, the Law written in the hearts of men, and the Law of *Moses*, differ only in the manner of delivery, and the degree of clearness, not in substance: wherefore also this Law the spirit is ready to assist, calling to repentance: and I see not how he may be refuted, who believes God will cumulate the use of this gift with greater, according to that general sentence, *Whosoever hath, i. makes use of former gifts, to him shall be given, i. greater gifts shall be granted.*

Neither is he guilty of a new opinion, who thinks so of the Divine Goodness. For 'tis the saying of *Prosper*: *There have been, and are gifts of this sort so general, that by their evidence men might be further'd in seeking*

ing the true God: unto which gifts, in all Ages witnessing the Author, the bounty of special Grace hath been superadded. And Austin saith: 'Tis not reckon'd to thee as a fault, that thou art ignorant against thy will, but that thou dost neglect to seek after that whereof thou art ignorant: nor, that thou dost not close up thy wounds, but that thou contemnest him who is willing to heal them. Bullinger saith: No Nation wanted true Religion, if they would have used it. Musculus: They have knowledge fit to lead them to the true worship of God, and would lead them, did they not binder it by their Idolatry. Martyr: The Heathens were inexcusable, because they performed not what was within their power. And after all, if one had a mind to maintain, that the Apostolical Preaching came unto all the Nations of the World, and the footsteps thereof are not wholly worn out, no not among the Indians, and Tartarians; arguments would not be wanting, and such as are of moment. But this would be a Question rather Historical than Theological.

Merit of Congruity, as the Papists call it, is very justly condemned by *Molinaus*: but I suppose he includes not in that name this opinion: That it is congruous, or agreeable unto the Divine will, without merit, to confer
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upon a man greater gifts, who uses former gifts, even before faith, as well as he can. For this opinion wholly excludeth merit. 1. Because that very use is not from the strength of nature, but from the strength given by prevenient Grace to one, not only meriting no good, but all evil. 2. Because, not the worthiness of mans act obtains the greater benefit, but the undeserved bounty of God affords it, Grace for Grace. 3. Because this is the nature of *merit*, that whatsoever is given in the way of merit, merit is the cause thereof; and for that reason it is given, otherwise not given: But now, the Preaching of the Gospel, and the gifts attending on it, happen to very many who have foully abused former gifts; so that an adequate rule of this concession cannot be taken from the use of former Grace. And this is mainly urged by the Fathers, to shew that the Grace of the Gospel is not given because of merit. For that which without any precedent obligation, without any discriminating sign, is common to him who rightly useth former gifts, and to him that does not; that must needs be a pure and mere gift, as well in the one sort as in the other.

That *Free will*, hath no strength from nature unto spiritual good: that Grace is efficacious

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ficacious (*i. actu secundo*) to give *not to resist*, and *to will* it self: that our salvation is wholly of Divine gift: that when we follow God calling, we owe it to the Grace of God: and in other things which are well said by *Molinæus* to the honor of Grace, I am of his mind. They are all without controversy amongst the Protestants.

But, though a man not yet regenerate be able to do no spiritual work, *i. truly and properly* such: though no man without faith can please God, *i. to Justification*: yet does it not follow hence, that a man excited by prevenient Grace (not at present regenerate) cannot, by the power of that Grace, do something which the Divine Goodness may accept of, so far, as to carry on the doer to that Grace without which he cannot be justified. Wherefore, whereas *Molinæus* saith; It is impious to hold any degree of *sufficient Grace*, without faith in Christ: 'tis very true, if you understand Grace *immediately* sufficient unto salvation, or remission of sins. And yet, *Prosper* is not to be accus'd, nor they that with *Prosper* affirm; The more general Grace preceding faith is sufficient to a remedy, understanding a *remote* sufficiency: because that Grace is apt to lead one by the hand (*as'twere*) to further Graces, and
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by Gods order is sufficient to that purpose.

So likewise, I conceive it is not to be denied, that before faith it self, there do in some precede certain *Dispositions* (effected doubtless by virtue of Grace prevenient) which are not found in other men. For when Christ saith, *Joh. 7. 17. If any one will do the will of my Father, he shall know of the Doctrine, whether it be of God:* He plainly setteth an obedient temper of mind, precedent to faith it self. So are some persons said to be *not far from the Kingdom of heaven, Marc. 12. 37.* to be *εὐχρηστοί*, well disposed to the Kingdom of God, *Lu. 9. 62.* to be *εὐχρηστοί*, of a more generous nature, *Act. 17. 11.* And this affection being the effect of Grace, some do apply here that text *Act. 13. 48.* where 'tis said *εὐεταγμένους*, the well ordered and disposed unto life eternal, and affected with a serious desire thereof, believed: and that other, *Joh. 8. 47. He that is of God* (by this pious inclination) *heareth the words of Christ,* with assent of faith. This surely is plain beyond denial: to read the holy Scriptures, to weigh them diligently, to meditate of their meaning, to frequent Godly Sermons, to compose himself to prayers, is in the power of a man, haply now at the point of new Birth,

Birth, and not yet fully born again.

I assent also unto *Molinæus*, none of the Reformed (as I suppose) gain saying: That the *Elect* resist not the call unto the end; nor can resist it, in the conjoynd sense (but all the doubt is about the sense divided) and the reason is, because God (as *Molinæus* himself confesseth) so bowe the will, as not to take away the liberty of the will.

The Question is, whether to the Conversion of man, any *previous* action of God be necessarily required (I say *previous*, for of the *concomitants* there's another reason) besides the concession of sufficient strength. For (say some) either something more is required, and then what was granted is denied, the strength is not sufficient; or the strength is really sufficient; and then it follows, that nothing more is requir'd. But, sufficient strength being granted, the will remains free, i. indeterminate, to do or not to do.

This for the elect, or such as are actually converted: but for others, who are not actually converted, the cause why *Grace is inefficacious*, many think it hard to attribute unto God, since in no wise it seemeth *Grace* which is inefficacious by Intention of the Giver. Nor doth it seem possible, that any one should be punisht more heavily for not do-

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ing that which was impossible to be done: namely, for not making that grace efficacious, which was in itself, at least in relation to the subject, inefficacious. Nor does it seem to these men enough, to avoid the making God the Author of unbelief, (which *Molinæus* conceives may be avoided by casting the cause upon mans nature) but withal care must be had of this also, lest the signs of Gods will be made to disagree with his will, and so injury be done to the Divine simplicity and sincerity. For how shall they be said called seriously, who are called with this mind, that they may not come; yea so, that they cannot come.

Here now do those Scriptures offer themselves to hand: *I desire not the death of a sinner, but that he be converted and live. But could I have done for my Vineyard, which I have not done? How often would I have gathered you, and you would not!* and such like, which do, both on Gods part, prove some will at least of converting; and on mans part not converted, argue a fault, not simply natural, and so necessary (as is necessary for a stone, not to live, saith *Molinæus*) but evitable by those helps which were granted, or were ready to be granted. For to those also, who being called to the Wedding would not come, all things

things yet are signified to be in readines. And verily, unless it be so, it seems a man may be punished for his sin that hinders him from believing; but cannot be punished more heavily for this, that (supposing sin, and this inevitable hindring) be believed none.

That saying which *Malinaus* dislikes: *It is in man to follow Gods calling, or not to follow;* though it may have a dangerous sense, is not yet without great Authors, and therefore may receive a benign interpretation: They which are helped to believe, such *Prosper*, have it in their power to come: *Austin*: Neither ought they to ascribe unto themselves, who are come, because they came being called; nor they that would not come, to lay the fault upon another, but on themselves alone; because being called, it was in their free power to come. Again, we have the beginning of our Salvation by Gods compassion; 'tis in our power to acquiesce in the saving inspiration. Wherefore the same Father explains the calling according to purpose by that manner of calling, as is fit for one to be called that he may follow, not to as being called he cannot chuse but follow. And although the same *Austin* very often describes vocation by *swasion*, yet I think all Pious men will grant to *Malinaus*, God doth not work by mere *swasions*, not only up-

on the mind, but upon the Will, by inspiring salutary affections, and not by changing the property of the will concreated with it.

To that Question touched by *Malinaus*, Why unto some the Gospel is not preached, or being preached, their Heart is not opened to believe? I see the antient Fathers have answer'd two ways, in a double respect. For if it be absolutely enquir'd, Why unto some people of *Bithynia*, and *Asia*, the Gospel was not preached at this or that time? The answer is, because of their voluntary sins; sins of that sort, for which God threatens he will send a Famine of the Word. Likewise, if it be enquir'd, why God hardens some to whom the Gospel is preached? the answer is, because they had harden'd themselves before. For, as *Austin* speaks; *Then began they to deserve punishment, when being call'd they neglected to come.* But if the Question be propos'd comparatively, Why to these the Gospel is preach'd rather than to those? Why this mans heart is touched with more Virtue than the others? Here it cannot be answer'd, so as to give a general Reason in either case from man: For its certain greater Benefits do often fall to them who are the more undeserving persons: Recourse must be had in this affair to the Divine Liberty.

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Next, as to the certainty of Salvation, I do exceedingly approve that which is set down by *Molinaus*. 1. That there are some degrees of true Faith which are overthrown. 2. That some Elect ones doubt of their Salvation. 3. That there is a certain peculiar degree of Faith, which never fails. 4. That full Assurance is to be earnestly beg'd of God. For, hence I collect. 1. That the Faith which fails, and which doth not fail, differ not so much in essence as degree; which also was the Opinion of *Iunius*. 2. That *Christ* obtain'd for us perseverance, and it was promis'd by God on this condition, that we ask and beg it with our earnest prayers; and therefore not at all absolutely. But, not to be deceived with ambiguity of words, we must note; all the Antients so affirm that Faith which may be overthrown, to be true Faith, as not to deny to it the effect also of Justification. For they openly pronounce: Many are damned for latter sins, to whom the former were remitted: Nor do they less consent to this, justifying Grace cannot at the same time consist with sins against Conscience, as Murther, Adultery, and such like. Wherefore, being some elect, after the gift of Faith received, fall into sins of this sort, as by too many Examples it is evident; it follows, and is clearly
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pronounced by the Holy Fathers, that there may be some time after Faith received, wherein a Person elect may not be in the state of Justification. These things, if need were, might be prov'd by many authorities, and by the confessions of Protestants. See *Confess. August. Art. 11. Angl. 16. Sax. 10.*

The ancient Authors seem to me to acknowledge three ways of certainty concerning Salvation. The first whereof is extraordinary, by Revelation: this *Austin* saith, happens to some: *what man can know he shall persevere to the end in the work and way of Righteousness, except he be assured by some Revelation from him, who by his just and secret judgment in this matter, doth not instruct all, but deceiveth none.* The ordinary ways are two; the one taken from the time, the other from the degree of Faith. Certainty of his salvation a faithful man may have from the time, who is at the point of death, and hath now no hope of life. For, being a Believer knows he doth believe, and withal knows a Believer is justified before God (both which by the testimony of Holy Scripture; and obvious Antiquity, we defend against the Papists) and this time of life is at an end, the Believer knows he dyeth in the state of Grace; and so is certain of his Salvation. In respect whereof, *Prosper* having said

said predestination is uncertain to us, addeth
*whilst we are among the perils of this present
 life.* The other ordinary manner of assu-
 rance is from the degree of Faith. For, the
 Antients do constantly deliver, that perfect
 Charity (according to the perfection of this
 life, for the most perfect, saith *Austin*, is not
 attained here) never fails. Notable is that of
*Jerome: Charity which Peter before his denial
 had, was in herb, and springs up young in every
 one before it is strengthened, and before its per-
 fection, is lost and recovered.* This is that root,
 which though the Sun, saith *Austin*, shine
 hot upon it, cannot wither. And to the same
 purpose he asketh, *which of the multitude of
 Believers can presume, himself is in the number
 of the predestinate: for naming the multitude,
 he seemeth to except some few excellent
 ones.*

Besides these three ways of certainty, there
 are other degrees inferior. For, as *Bernard*
 himself also doth acknowledge with all Antiqui-
 ty, God hath not left his Elect without a tes-
 timony of consolation in this life. This testi-
 mony, the more and greater are the exercises
 of Piety, is so much the more certain, which
 the holy Scripture demonstrates plainly, when
 we are commanded to make our calling and e-
 lection firm and sure, by Faith, Virtue, Know-
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ledge, Continnence, Patience, Piety, Love and Charity: whence that saying of *Austin*, agreeing with the Antients, *Fear is so much abated as Charity is increased.*

I proceed now to that part of the Writing, where *Molinaus* separates himself from those, who against all Antiquity affirm, Men are created to this end that they may perish; and putting *Reprobation* before the fall, put upon themselves a necessity of attributing to God the efficacious procurement of all sins, even of the first sin also: because, he that absolutely sets the end, ought withal to set the means, without which there is no coming unto the end. Here the most learned man, walking heedfully, does with a little fear declare his judgment, saying, he digesteth not such kind of speaking: to wit, because they are persons of great Authority that so speak. But truly, the danger is not in the form of words, but in the Doctrine itself. For, that Opinion directly runs into the *Anathema* of the *Arausican* Council, boldly pronounced by *Augustin* and *Prosper*.

And here it is to be admired; whereas all they that deduce sins from a fatal necessity, were by the ancient Church cast unto the *Manichees*: the worst and most hated Hereticks; but the *Semipelagians* were suffered very long in their Commu-

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Communion; why at this day, on the contrary, such as make God partly unjust, partly unmerciful, partly the Author of all wickedness, live freely without censure. But, if any man do conceive more meanly of Grace, though not near to Pelagianism, all do every where rise against him with equal animosity. Is the fault so much less, to load the Benefactor with contumelies, than to deny the benefit?

Rightly indeed, and agreeably both to the *Gallie* and *Belgie* Confession doth *Molinæus* pronounce, *Reprobation is not but in the corrupt mass.* But this corrupt Mass, some consider in original sin alone, catching that which is spoken of *Esaie* and *Jacob*; albeit that very speech is such as goeth afore of *Isaac* and *Ismael*, which the *poete* himself else where declares to be Allegorical. (*Gen. 4.*) It was, I confess, *Austin's* opinion, which displeases most of the Reformed; That some children dying in their Infancy are damned for original sin. But *Austin* could not think this of *Esaie*: because, in his opinion, original sin was taken away by circumcision. Others consider the corrupt Mass in actual sins: to whom *Molinæus* seems to consent when he saith, some men are designd to punishments for sins which willingly and by *God unpro-*

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vok'd

provok'd they have admitted. Lastly, some there are that consider this corrupt Mass, not in any sort of sins, but in the contempt of Vocation: for whom that sentence of *Austin*, concerning the same *Esau*, seems to stand; He did not will, he did not run: but if he had willed and runned, he had attained by the help of God, who would give him to run and to will by calling, unless by contempt of the call he would become a reprobate. Out of this sentence therefore might be added to the words of *Molinæus*, by God unprovok'd, yea and seriously invited to repentance.

Hither have I been carried unaware (for when I began to write I purposed to dispatch in brief) by the relection of that Paper, wherein the sentiments of *Molinæus* are contain'd. Of which I was not willing to deliver my own Judgment; nor would I have you think so. But, as it is a pleasure to me to compare the ancient Writers with the modern, so I esteem'd it worth my pains, most noble Sir, to advertise you of that which (if I am not much deceiv'd) by my not indiligent reading I have learned, the Judgment of the Fathers touching these controversies. You may, so judicious you are, collate the commentations of the ancient and more recent Authors one with other; and so far as your busi-

business will permit, consider which of their different Interpretations is more consonant to the sacred Context, to Reason by God illuminate, and to the edification of Gods Church.

In the Writing of *Molinaus*, after the explication of his sentence, follows a Collection of certain Articles, wherein he thinks the parties will easily agree. Of some things in them I have already made my Remarks, as may appear by what I have said before, having anticipated them lest the matter should be severed. What remains shall now be added.

Free will, by the fall of our first Parents, is rightly said, to be lost in respect of pious actions, as it hath no strength to actions of that kind: not so, as to signifie the native liberty is not in the will, without which it cannot be a will, and by which it cannot will and nill supposing all prerequisites, i. strength to will being granted. Therefore *Austin* saith. *Who among us affirms, that by the sin of the first man, free will perished from all mankind?* And to exclude here all together pious actions, other sayings will not permit. If no grace of God, how does he save the world? if no free will, how does he judge the world? And, *The Divine*

*Ad Bonif. 1. 1.
Epist. 46.*

Divine precepts would be profitable to no man, had he no free choice of will. Also, The Catholick Faith denies not free will *atque lib. 1. c. 1.* neither to good life nor bad; nor attributes to it any power without grace. Elsewhere, He that denies free will is not a Catholick: but he is a Catholick, who saies that without God it can neither begin nor finish any good work. By which saying 'tis not signified, that by nature we have to will well (which is Pelagian) but by nature we have this thing to will: which being inform'd by grace, we will well. For grace is the Principle from which, the will or free choice is the principle in which conversion is made. That of Austin: *De fide ad Pet.* No will of man resisteth God being willing to save: is so to be explained, that another sentence of his lately cited be not contradicted; where he saith, *It is imputed to many that they contemn God willing to heal.* There is then a certain Will conditionate, which Prosper calls *inviting*: there is also an absolute Will, which follows a certain, at least conditionate pre-science.

That of Molinæus, whom God hath predestinated to the end, i. Salvation, he hath predestinated to the means; seemeth plainly to define, that before he determines any thing concerning

ing Faith, he determines absolutely to save this man. Which definition segregates from us all the Fathers before *Austin*. Whether it agrees with *Austin* himself, is disputed: unless perchance the word *predestination* be so generally taken, as to comprehend also that which is not absolute, but which the means supposed passeth into absolute.

Concerning the word *sufficient grace*, and *necessary*, and *free*, we have already spoken. That none of them can perish, whom God hath predestinated to the Kingdom; none by any means be saved, whom he hath not predestinated unto life, is fully true in the conjoynd sense, what way soever predestination, so it be absolute, is taken: but in the divided sense 'twill be true, if this were true that reprobation is without prescience of a free act: which *Molinus* seemeth to deny. Surely, *Prosper* was not afraid to say,

Because they are foreknown the predestinate will not fall: And,

They should be predestinate if they would return and persevere

in holiness. Again, Because he foreknew they would fall by their own will, for this he did not separate them from the Sons of perdition by any predestination. Again, Therefore were they not predestinate, because they were fore-

Ad. obj. Vint. risp. 12. Ad. Can. Gal. 7. 1. Senis sup. cit. c. 7.

known

known that they after would be such by voluntary prevarication. I will add this on the by; the Book *De fide ad Petram*, out of which is cited that newly mentioned sentence, is by the learned thought not to be the work of *Austin*, and that upon weighty arguments.

That which is said, *God hath elected the predestinate to believe*, is well said, since every benefit unto which not all attain, is justly signified in Scripture by the word *election*. Neither yet does it follow hence, that the same men can no way be said to be elected, i. to be justified because they believe, if the word *because* denote not the cause deserving, but in any manner anteceding. In the same manner, he sheweth mercy to us that we may be faithful: nor yet must we deny, there is some mercy following faith, and therefore shewed to the faithful, as such. God by giving faith makes men hear the Gospel worthily: but yet we must not therefore deny, God out of his immense goodness, whereby he converts many long contumacious, will not purposely exclude from that benefit the less contumacious, and such as diligently read and hear his word: Neither seems it fit to be denied, that such as do attentively hear the Preachers of Gods word, are less unworthy of the gift of

of faith, than such as stop their ears like the hearers of *St. Steven*. Thus in the Gospel, the Apostles coming into any City or Village are bid to enquire, who in that place is worthy: to whom they are opposed as unworthy, who will not receive the Apostles, nor give audience to the word. *Mat. 10.* And in the *Acts* the *Jews* are said, then at last to have judged themselves unworthy of eternal life (i. by a greater and more special unworthiness) after they were filled with wrath, and contradicted the word, and that with blasphemy, *Act. 13.* But, if any man, speaking not figuratively or comparatively, say there is in the unregenerate any ability to do that whereby he may be worthy to attain to faith, that his opinion is dangerous none I think will deny.

Now whereas *Molinus* saith, the Causes why he hath elected these, not elected those, are with God, and not anxiously to be enquir'd by us; first he seems to intimate, that the only and universal cause of this discrimination is not the divine pleasure: For this cause were open enough, to exclude other causes whatsoever. And when he saith, they are not anxiously to be enquir'd, he seems to grant, they may be enquir'd, at least in some manner: which seems not far from

from that opinion of *Austin* (which many think was retracted by him) where he saith, the cause why this person rather than that is reprobated, proceedeth from our own merits. Because the grosser *Papists* refer the word *merit* to the nature of the work and to commutative justice, we do upon very good grounds not dare to use this word. The Fathers took to *merit* for that which is to obtain by doing somewhat; and *merit* for a pious work unto which is a due reward by liberal and gracious promise. So, the word being molified, we shall less wonder now, if among the Fathers more antient than *Austin* we find, man is predestinate for merits. For they speake of an absolute decree of giving glory by way of reward. whence *Ambrose*: whose merits he hath foreknown, their rewards he hath predestinated.

To conclude this part: Really, I am of *Molinæus*'s judgment, that in these controversies such an Article may be contrived, to which the *French*, *English*, *Belgians*, *Helvetians*, embracing the more pure Religion, will subscribe: and the Article may best be taken out of the *Arauscan* Council, and out of *Prosper* Sentences *ad capitula Gallorum*. And I think this ought to be the scope. That in good the honor of
grace

grace may be kept inviolate; in evil, man may accuse himself, and not draw God at all into the Society of his crime. Moreover, That man may be taught, neither to distrust the Divine assistance, nor seek security in any other way but in the Study of piety. Withal, I would wish that sobriety to be used in determining questions, that a fit respect may not only be had for *Austin*, and *Prosper*, and *Fulgentius*, but also that men may abstain from condemning those sentences, in which 'tis manifest most holy men liv'd and dy'd; who after the *Apostles* and before the Empire of *Constantine*, in the Ages most conspicuous for all piety, edified the Church of Christ by their words and writings, by their life and blood.

I am now come to the last part, which is concerning the *Magistrato*. And here *Molineus* saith pleasantly, He is eas'd by me, because I am forward to teach him what ought to be his Opinion. Wherein he shews himself much mistaken in my purpose. For my intent was, neither to teach him (whom I thought fit to be admonish'd by your Honor, as from your self, touching some things, and that he should never see what I had written to you) nor to teach any other, but freely to deposit my thoughts in

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your bosom, my most noble Friend. And that, upon this occasion: because I understood by you, that *Molinaus* bestowed upon learned Magistrates some Right which he would not grant to the less learned. That did not please me, I confess: and therefore I gave a clear distinction, as it seemeth to me, and perspicuous, between the *right* or power, and the *Aptitude* or Ability. But *Molinaus* here was so far from taking my sense, that he ascribes to me a meaning contrary to my words. He saith, I would have a *right of making laws* to pertain to the learned Magistrates. I said it not, yea I signified the contrary, *that learning makes nothing to the right it self*. He saith after, a Senator or Judge, if he be a Lawyer, is so, as he is a judge. I much dislike this. For there are many Lawyers, not Judges, and many Judges not Lawyers. The one is a name of office, the other of skill. Take another example. There are many Pastors (alas!) too unskilful of holy letters. Their office is to interpret Scripture, nor are they without a right, but they have not an Aptitude there-to requisit. Science therefore neither giveth nor encreaseth right, but to the good using of it conduceth much. An unskilful Prince (not to speak yet of *Church-affairs*) hath
no

no less right to give commands in civil affairs, and to make laws, than a Prince most learned. I much admire, these things were not consider'd by a man most acute. That which is spoken of knowledge, understand also of probity of mind. He must be a good man, that will govern well: but the right it self of governing depends no more upon Virtue, than the dominion of a private estate. For, the covetous man is as well Master of his goods, as the liberal; though the liberal rightly useth riches, which the covetous abuseth.

Molinaus supposed, I would have the Magistrate, who shall govern the Church, to be *Orthodox*. Really I would, and all rich men to be liberal. He asketh, who shall judge whether the Magistrate be *Orthodox*? If himself, great danger: if others, then will the Magistrate be subject to others Judgment. I will ask likewise, who shall judge whether the Magistrate be sufficiently skill'd in civil matters? and if that argumentation prevail, I will conclude the Magistrate to be subject to the judgment of the people. I will ask again, when the Magistrate must apply himself to some Church, who shall judge whether this, or that Church be the more *Orthodox*? shall he, or the Church? If he, there is also the same danger as be-

fore: if the Church, this is to beg the question: for there is no Assembly of Christians, which calls not it self a Church, and that Orthodox too. But, saith he, an Infidel Magistrate will abuse this example, and usurp the same power. As if, to alledge an incommodity were to solve the Argument. What is there in humane affairs without some incommodity? May not I in like manner say, if that be given to the Church which I conceive is to be given to the Magistrate, an Assembly of Heretical Pastors will also abuse this example and usurp the same right, if any where it prevail, as it hath happened more than once. I will answer in the words of *Austin*: *Kings, when they are in Error, make laws for error against the truth; and when they are in the truth, make laws for truth against error. So are good men tryed by evil laws, and by good laws are evil men reformed.* You see how little *Austin* feared that incommodity. And in truth, it is of no moment. *Aurelian* the Emperor was not Orthodox: therefore he could not expell from his Bishoprick the Heretick *Samosatenus*. This consequence was not perceived by the Holy Fathers, who yielded the judgment of *Samosatenus* to the Emperor so far, that the cause being examined, they requested
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he might by the Imperial authority be dethron'd. Neither would *Paul* have appealed unto *Nero*, had he believed, no right of judging in a case of Religion belonged to him. Wherefore, as *Trajan* civilly honest, *Nero* wicked, are nevertheles equal in the right of Government; so pious *Constantine*, and impious *Nero* are equal in the right of judging, in aptitude and skill unequal.

This most learned man further enquires, whether by Governing the Church I understand being judge in the heads of faith; or, a power to purge the Church of scandals, and to command belief of those things which are contained in the word of God. But I wonder these are parted, which do seem to me indissolubly joyned. For, if it be the office of a King to command, that those things be taught which are true, that scandals be avoided; amongst which Heresies have the chief place; how shall he do this unless he judge, what is true, what is Heresy. For the act of commanding requires the power of judging. But he saith, Those things must be commanded to be believed, which are establishd by the Assembly of Pastors Orthodox. And he that says this, does he not shew, 'tis at least required to judge who are those Orthodox Pastors. Now, because

because the examples of King Edward, of the States of *Holland*, of the Prince of *Orange* are alledged. I enquire: when there were in *England* Romish Pastors, and there were also Reformed; in *Holland* not only Romish, but Anabaptists also and Lutherans; that the Reformed Religion was publickly introduced in both Nations, other being either prohibited or postposed; did it not so come to pass, because the King, the States, the Prince, judged this Religion pure? They embraced then what was suggested by faithful Pastors and demonstrated by Scripture, not for the Authority of Pastors (for there were many families of them) but because they judged the things agreeable to the Scripture. Albeit they understood not the knots and subtilities of Theology, it was sufficient that they did cast off Idolatry and Popish Tyranny, and other errors, with an assured judgment.

A question follows, impertinent to this place, touching a King, who will with blasphemous mouth receive the holy mysteries. I answer: either this is forbidden by Divine law, or not: If forbidden by Divine law (as I conceive it is, if the King be supposed not yet repenting) the King will not be subject to the Ecclesiastick laws, which *Molinus* saith,

saith, but to the Divine, which none denies. The like is in a judge of petty causes, commanded by the King to give sentence against equity. This Judge will not do so, if he be wise. Is the King therefore subject to the Judge? No verily: but the Judge is so subject to the King, that he must acknowledge, above the earthly King, the Empire of his heavenly King, who forbiddeth injury to be done to any. But, if you suppose here some law, not Divine but positive, proceeding from humane will; to this law who-soever shall affirm a king to be subject, so as to be unable in any case to relax the legal bond, he denies him to be a King.

The Canons of many Synods forbid Episcopal seats to be erected into *Metropolitan*; they forbid new Bishops or *Metropolitans* to be constituted, or a Bishop to do sacred offices in another Diocese: they forbid Bishops to undertake civil employments. Nevertheless, by command of the Emperors all this was done very often. The Greek Interpreters give the reason, because the Emperor is not subject, neither to the Laws nor Canons.

Next, *Molinaus* enquires, whether the Kings Counsellors must be Doctors of Divinity, or it be also necessary for the king to be

be a learned Divine. Verily, my opinion is, that the knowledge of things Divine is requisite in a King and in his chief Counsellors; not that he may be a King, They Counsellors, but to the end they may rightly perform the work of their places. But I say not such knowledge, as to distinguish every truth from falshood (for the greatest Professor of Theology cannot promise himself this) but to put a *difference between things necessary to be believed or done, and things not necessary*; between Heretical and not Heretical. And in the same manner I conceive, both the knowledge of the laws, and the art of Governing are desired in a King. But, saith *Molinæus*, 'tis fit the less learned be taught by the more learned. This argument, if it prove the less learned must submit to the judgment of the more learned, then in Synods also the Pastors ought to yield to the Doctors: for *Molinæus* names them as men of the greatest learning. And yet 'tis certain, that Pastors have not less, if not more right than Doctors. Our men are wont to use the testimony of *Panormitan*, that a private person's Judgment, confirmed with better authority of Scripture, is to be prefer'd before the judgment of a Patriarch. To come to the matter, It is indeed the part of the more learned

ed to teach the less learned, but not to have command over them. Therefore a Country Judge (as the laws tell us) is not obliged by the Response of Lawyers; nor is a sick man bound to the prescript of his Physician, but so far as no reason of his own strongly persuades him to the contrary.

Another question follows. whether a *Magistrate* may adjoyn himself to the lesser number of Pastors. Strange, that this should be asked by a Pastor reformed, seeing all Magistrates, who have in our age reform'd the Church, rightly believ'd the lesser number of Pastors against the greater. But in the *Nicene Synod* *Constantine* yielded to the more, and did not addict himself to the fewer. Yea, he yielded to the plain and manifest truth, which the greater number at that time by Gods blessing followed. This doth not always happen: for the greater part oft overcomes the better. But if sentences are to be numbred, not weighed, the *Arimin* Council of cccc. Bishops will be of more value than the *Nicene* of cxviii. And what should the Emperor have done, when (as *Jerom* testifies) the whole World groaned and wonderd it was turned *Arian*; was paucity then to be despised, multitude to be followed? No man in his right mind will say so. The

two Kings are blamed for not believing one *Michas*, rather than four hundred false Prophets. Well then, the different parties are to be heard, but the Prince ought to lend his authority to that cause, not which hath most suffrages, but whose equity the vigor of truth well try'd hath commended to him. That Rule, *Every man must be believ'd in his own Art*, hath some probability, but not perpetual certainty. And there is a difference of Arts-men, that often times it is expedient to trust a few rather than many: So true is the common saying, *The worst are most*. Theology indeed is not the proper Art of a King: but the Art most convenient for him is that which learned Writers call *regal, leading, architectonical*: whereof the most noble part is that which I have named, the knowledge of things Divine; not descending to all subtilties of the School, nor yet staying within the mean endowments of a private man; but comprehending all the chiefest points, and of such a measure, that if any thing be wanting, it may be supplied by the Ministry of others. And I have said before, the like measure of other Arts, is desir'd in a King; though I doubt not, if there be any science to which a King should addict his peculiar study, it is Theology. They

They greatly erre, who do either represent, or make it so obscure and difficult, as to deter Princes from that study, which the Divine law so much commends unto them. But if in that respect the highest power in causes Ecclesiastical is to be denied the King, neither will the right of making laws, many being better Lawyers, belong unto him. I fear also, that the same reason will exclude many Pastors from all right of suffrage.

I do not well understand what *Molinæus* saith of the King of *England*. For he affirmeth him to be the supreme Judge in all Causes, as well Ecclesiastick as civil, yet not to be the judge of controversies, nor to own that Title. How Controversies can be exempt from the universal appellation of Causes I see not, when Judgment is not usually given but of things controverted. But he seemeth to distinguish between matters of Faith and other Church-affairs. But, to judge what is an Idol, what is Idolatry, does it not pertain to Faith? Queen *Elizabeth*, and her brother King *Edward*, preferred the Reformation above *Papism*: not by an ignorant zeal, I suppose, but with good judgment. Now, the contention between the Papists and the Reformed is concerning Articles of Faith.

The King, whose words are alledged, as removing from himself the judgment about Articles of Faith, did he not hear at Hampton Court, the Bishops on the one side, the Puritans on the other? as Arbitrer, as Judge? When the Conference was not only of Church Government, but of predestination, and assurance of salvation. Did he not pronounce what seemed to him right? What is it then, that he putteth from himself? That authority, which the Pope claimeth, who makes himself a Judge infallible, to be believ'd on his own word, without the Scriptures. This Right certainly is due neither to King nor Council. For, neither may a Council be believ'd for it self, but for the testimony of Scripture on which it relies: because true Faith of things Divine cannot be had but by Divine authority. This sense of the King, the King himself shall I say, or *Molinaus* best of all explains in his book against Cardinal *Perron*, saying, The Emperors never ascribed to themselves absolute judgment and infallible concerning Doctrine; but that they took knowledge of the Decisions of Councils, and not of Discipline alone, he there both confesses and proves; adding, that the Emperors examin'd, whether nothing was decreed, in the Assembly of

of Bishops, repugnant to former Councils: and that, unless this be lawful for a King, the King will be nothing else but *Lessor Ecclesiasticorum*.

Hence it appears sufficiently, that the Kings judgment is bound to the word of God, but may be instructed and led by the Bishops; yet not so, but that he ought to make use of his own judgment. And reason exacts as much. For no action is good, but which proceeds from the judgment of the doer; and the King, as King, his office is to cherish true Doctrine by his laws, and to suppress the contrary. He ought therefore to have judgment also of the Doctrine. Nor is here any more attributed to a King than to a private man. For private men, for themselves, by the Word of God, judge of Articles of Faith; but the effects differ, in as much as a King can do more than a private person: as also the judgment of a Father of a family, who is chief in a great house, is more largely extended than his, who is the poor inhabitant of a Cottage.

To that censure, where they are called flatterers who moved this question in Holland, it were easy to return one as sharp, that they are justly suspected of affecting a new papacy, who so much decline the judgment of the Magistrate.

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What follows, that it might more easily be suffered that the Magistrates should judge of controversies in Religion, if our Country were sure to have such Magistrates as it hath now; I cannot fully approve, knowing, *These* ought not to be changed as the Times change: nor is any thing, because expedient, the more or less true. Herein also he is mistaken, when he opposeth a few Magistrates to a great assembly of Pastors: For with us the Government is not in the hand of fewer persons then they who are wont to meet in Synods; who, if they be not as skilful in Theological points as the Pastors are (though he that thinks so knows not what many of our Pastors be, bur grant this) Surely they are, for the keeping of peace and tranquillity much better affected, than they that are the Preachers of peace. For, so much as skill conduceth unto judgment, no less doth study of parties hinder it.

We do not speak this, that Judgments of Synods should be omitted. No verily, for they are of very great use. But for a King to be so tyed up with them, that against his own conscience he ought to follow the Synodical decrees, I cannot consent to this. And these matters are under dispute among

us: but in Germany and other places the Princes do openly exercise this Right; not one of the Pastors contradicting.

I must now make an end: for if I would cast into paper whatsoever comes into my mind about this Argument, I should be not sparing of my own time, and prodigal of yours. This only I protest to you in conclusion, that concerning predestination of Grace, Free will, and other questions of this kind, I had rather hear the Judgments of other men than declare my own; but of Magistrates I have here said nothing, whereof I am not very certain. 1515.

The decease of Grotius

Doctor *Quistorpius* in his letter dated at Rostoch. Anno 1645.

*The next day after his entrance into this City (Aug. 18.) He sent for me about nine at night. I came, and found him drawing nigh to death. I saluted him and said: Oh, that I had been so happy, as to have conferred with you safely arrived! Thus it hath pleased God, said he. I exhorted him to prepare himself for a blessed departure, to confess himself a sinner, to be sorry for his sins,
and

and with the Publican beg for mercy. I, saith he, am that Publican. Then proceeding, I re-
 fer him to Christ, without whom is no salvation.
 He adds, In Christ alone is all my hope repo-
 sed. I rehearsed aloud the usual Form of Prayer,
 Heer Jesu, &c. He with closed hands, and
 an humble voice said after me. At the end, I
 asked whether he understood me. He replied,
 I understand you well. I go on, minding
 him of such Scriptures as are wont to be sug-
 gested at the hour of death, and ask, if he un-
 derstands me. He answers, I hear your voice,
 but hardly understand what you say. Having
 said this, he was silent, and a little after ex-
 pired, at the point of twelve. Let him rest in
 peace.

The End.

After

